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EMORY LAW JOURNAL 
Volume 40 FALL 1991 Number 4 
ESSAYS 
COMPOUNDING OR CREATING CONFUSION ABOUT 
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION? A REPLY TO 
PROFESSOR FREER 
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.* 
Stephen B. Burbank** 
Thomas M. Mengler*** 
Ah, the polemical mode. Where would we be without it? Better off, 
perhaps; polemics can make it harder to separate wheat from chaff. In a 
recent Essay in this journaP that includes a critique of the new federal 
supplemental jurisdiction statute,2 Professor Richard Freer purports to 
* Professor of Law, Duke University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia. 
** Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
*** Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
1 Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Lift After Finley and the Supple-
mental jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991). 
• 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). To save space and reduce the need for page-flipping, 
we omit quoting the statute in full here. Its subsection (a) provides: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by 
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related 
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental ju-
risdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
Subsection (b), quoted and discussed later, provides for exceptions in cases over which jurisdiction 
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separate the wheat from the chaff and then proceeds to torch the farm, 
exuberantly and extensively telling the federal courts how to get it all 
wrong. We three meeting again3 under fire need to take care not to re-
spond out of some offended pride of kibitzership, for we did help in fram-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in the last weeks of the 101st Congress;' Still, we 
hope we can show litigants and courts how to live their waking hours 
without suffering Professor Freer's nightmare. 
Professor Freer's Essay makes several main criticisms of the new sup-
plemental jurisdiction statute. First, he ·suggests that the lower federal 
courts were coalescing on a sensible, limiting view of the Supreme Court's 
hostile approach to supplemental jurisdiction over added parties in Finley 
v. United States,6 by which he may mean that there was little need for 
legislation and that Congress could have left well enough alone. Second, 
he charges that by limiting the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in 
cases with original jurisdiction founded only on section 1332, the statute 
- part of legislation meant to implement the recommendations of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee [FCSC] - does not do what the FCSC 
suggested. His third objection, related to the second, is that the statute 
"codifies a fundamental anti-diversity bias,''6 wreaking a "punishment 
exists solely under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), the general diversity statute. Subsections (c) and (d) deal 
respectively with discretionary authority to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and with stat-
ute of limitations matters. Subsection (e) is definitional. 
3 See Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Sup-
plemental jurisdiction, 74 juDICATURE 213 (1991) [hereinafter Invitation]; Mengler, Burbank, & 
Rowe, Recent Federal Court Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, Nat'! L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, 
at 20, col. 4. 
• See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 27 n.13 (1990) [hereinafter HousE REPORT) 
(acknowledging assistance of several persons in development and revision of draft statute). 
0 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (no pendent party jurisdiction over private codefendant in Federal Tort 
Claims Act suit against United States, despite exclusive federal court jurisdiction over claim against 
government). 
For uniformity, we will ordinarily use the new statute's general term "supplemental jurisdiction" 
instead of the previous multiplicity of labels, even when discussing cases decided before the adoption of 
section 1367. "Pendent jurisdiction" had usually referred to a federal question plaintiff's inclusion or 
addition of a related state law claim against the same defendant without an independent basis of 
jurisdiction. "Pendent party jurisdiction" ordinarily referred to a federal question plaintiff's effort to 
add a related state law claim against a new party without independent jurisdictional grounds. "Ancil-
lary jurisdiction" most commonly referred to jurisdiction without independent grounds over claims 
and parties added by those other than the plaintiff, such as compulsory counterclaims and impleader 
of third-party defendants. Section 1367's term "supplemental jurisdiction" embraces the entire area 
covered by the earlier labels. 
e Freer, supra note 1, at 476. 
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[on] the diversity plaintiff'' that is "absurd."7 
Fourth, Professor Freer asserts that the new law mistakenly locks in 
the complete diversity rule as applied to alienage cases. Fifth, he says, the 
legislation resolves in the wrong way a well-recognized anomaly under 
prior law, the different treatment for supplemental jurisdiction purposes 
of a "necessary" party depending on whether joinder is sought at the 
party's initiative by intervention under Rule 24 or at the behest of a party 
or the court under Rule 19. Sixth, he claims that the statute adopts a 
nonsensical rule in permitting the joinder of a nondiverse necessary party 
defendant under Rule 19 while forbidding plaintiffs from asserting claims 
against such a defendant. Finally, Professor Freer argues that section 
1367 is badly drafted, requiring judicial contortions correctly to resolve 
some, and wholly neglecting other, problems he envisions. 
1. The Finley Rationale and the Need for Legislation 
Finley held that a private plaintiff suing the United States in a Federal 
Tort Claims Act case could not join a private defendant without an inde-
pendent basis of federal court jurisdiction. The result, given that the 
United States can be sued under that statute only in federal court, meant 
that plaintiffs often had to split their actions (sue the United States in 
federal court and co-citizen defendants on state law claims in state court) 
or forgo claims against one or the other of the prospective defendants. 
However narrowly the lower courts might have limited its application, 
Finley's holding itself was well worth overruling,8 and the Supreme Court 
was not about to do the job. 
By listing section 1367's overruling of Finley in his very short discus-
7 Id. at 480. 
• See REPoRT OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS STUDY CoMM. 47 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC 
REPORT]: 
As a result [primarily of Finley], a litigant with related claims against two different parties 
- one within and one outside original federal jurisdiction - may have to choose between 
(1) splitting the claims and bringing duplicative actions in state and federal courts; (2) 
abandoning one of the claims altogether; or (3) filing the entire case in state court, thus 
delegating the determination of federal issues to the state courts. The first alternative 
wastes judicial resources. The second is unfair to the claimant. The third forces litigants to 
bring a wide variety of federal claims into state courts and in some cases is unavailable 
because federal jurisdiction over the federal aspect is exclusive. 
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sion of "What Is Good About the Statute,"9 Professor Freer seems to 
agree. Nonetheless, he could be questioning the need for legislation, or at 
least anything more than narrow legislation to overrule just the Finley 
result, when he argues that "there is reason to believe that the lower 
courts would have dealt with [Finley] as [they] had the [Supreme Court's 
narrow supplemental jurisdiction] opinions of the 1970s, basically limiting 
it to its facts.mo · 
As Professor Freer admits, lower court decisions after Finley were split 
on supplemental jurisdiction over third-party claims.U Yet more decisions 
reading Finley for all it was worth kept coming down, both as to third-
party claims12 and - despite Freer,s assertion that this was the only area 
in which Finley had thus far caused difficulty13 - in other contexts as 
welP4 
• See Freer, supra note 1, at 473-74. 
10 Id. at 446 (footnote omitted). Professor Freer's Essay does not make explicit what he con-
cludes from this prediction. Early in the Essay he writes, "Had the statute simply overruled Finley 
and codified extant practice ... it would have been a welcome addition to the federal jurisdiction 
family." I d. If he agrees that legislation was needed to overrule Finley, then it seems largely irrelevant 
what the lower federal courts were doing with the precedent; the debate should focus on the content of 
the overruling legislation. He may, however, be suggesting that instead of getting "involved," Con-
gress should have "give(n] [the lower federal courts the] chance" to "read Finley narrowly." See id. at 
469 (footnote omitted}. If so, we disagree. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
11 See Freer, ·supra note 1, at 467-69. 
12 Professor Freer cites two opinions that questioned or rejected supplemental jurisdiction over 
original defendants' claims against third-party defendants, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Corp. v. Spartan Mech. 
Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. N.Y. 1990), and Community Coffee Co. v. M/S Kriti Amethyst, 715 
F. Supp. 772 (E.D. La. 1989). Three more cases holding that Finley requires independent jurisdic-
tional grounds for impleader are 0 & K Trojan, Inc. v. Mun. & Contractors Equip. Corp., 751 F. 
Supp. 431, 434-35 (S.D. N.Y. 1990); FDIC v. Israel, 739 F. Supp. 1411 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (using 
California state courts' "cross-claim" terminology but apparently involving Rule 14 third-party 
claims); and U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Reading Municipal Airport Auth., 130 F.R.D. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Pa. 
1990). See also 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1444, at 328 (2d c;d. 1990) (Finley "raises some question whether the Court might reject ancillary 
jurisdiction" over Rule 14 claims); id. § 1436, at 276 (same assertion with respect to persons added 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(h) as parties to compulsory counterclaims or cross-claims). 
18 Freer, supra note 1, at 468. 
" See, e.g., Perkins v. Halex Co., 744 F. Supp. 169, 175-76 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that 
Finley forbids supplemental jurisdiction over codefendant in cases removed under then-applicable ver-
sion of separate-claim removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988)); Mayerson v. Amity Travel, Ltd., 
No. 90-1359 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file} (holding that Finley pre-
cludes supplemental jurisdiction over codefendant in case removed by foreign state under 28 U .S.C. § 
1441(d} (1988)). See also In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1326-29 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that Finley and other Supreme Court precedents undermine rule that 
in a diversity class action, only the class representatives must be of diverse citizenship from the 
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To the extent that narrow reading was taking place, Professor Freer 
and some lower courts whose opinions he cites may have been paying 
inadequate heed to the strength of Finley's admonition not to read juris-
dictional statutes broadly when it comes to the addition of parties. The 
Finley majority's rationale - that "with respect to the addition of parties, 
as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume that the full 
constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not 
read jurisdictional statutes broadlym5 - cuts a broad S\vath. Indeed, in 
the face of that language, we question whether the lower courts struggling 
to read Finley narrowly were being anything but inappropriately in-
subordinate. As the Fifth Circuit has put it, "[t]he precise meaning of 
Finley has engendered a tremendous disarray of authority in the federal 
courts. Some courts analyze pendent party jurisdiction as if Finley were 
never decided."16 · 
Moreover, there is little if any reason to believe that the Court would 
have tolerated continued disregard of the broad principle it announced in 
Finley. To the contrary, as 'Professor Freer has emphasized with evident 
distaste, there is recent precedent for the Court getting "involved again,"17 
"[j]ust when it seemed that the lower courts had [by Freer's lights] worked 
things out fairly well."16 
In any event, now that section 1367 is on the books, the focus does not 
belong on what the lower courts had been doing since Finley and the 
somewhat obscure implications of those decisions for what Congress 
should have done. The Supreme Court in Finley sent a clear message to 
Congress: "Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction ... can of 
course be changed by Congress. What is of paramount importance is that 
Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretative 
defendants). 
1° Finley, 490 U.S. at 549. 
18 Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1062 n.4 (5th Gir. 1990) (footnotes omitted). See also 
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1990). 
17 Freer, supra note 1, at 464 (referring to Supreme Court's intervention via Finley after lower 
federal courts had developed case law under Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), and Owen 
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)). 
18 !d. See also id. at 452 ("The Supreme Court addressed each of [two key supplemental juris-
diction] situations in the 1970s in opinions that injected new considerations into the supplemental 
jurisdiction calculus and threatened to affect practice even in those areas where the rules had become 
well established.") (footnote omitted). 
948 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40 
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."~9 In short, 
if you don't like what we've done, codify the area. Congress did so; what 
should concern us now is the fidelity of the statute to the FCSC's recom-
mendation and, especially, section 1367's worth as a framework for sup-
plemental jurisdiction in pr~ctice. 
2. The Federal Courts Study Committee's Recommendation and the 
Supplemental jurisdiction Statute 
According to Professor Freer, the new statute does not do "what the 
Federal Courts Study Committee had suggested that it do."20 In its Re-
port in April 1990, the FCSC recommended that Congress "authorize 
federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an inde-
pendent federal jurisdictional base."21 Professor Freer states that the 
FCSC's suggestions "were quite broad and evidently would have allowed 
supplemental jurisdiction over all transactionally related claims, subject 
only to a discretionary power to dismiss in the interest of federalism. "22 
He is a vehement critic of the Supreme Court's decision in Owen Equip-
ment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,23 which rejected supplemental jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs' claims against third-party defendants in diversity 
cases. He views the FCSC as having recommended what he favors -
legislation to overrule Kroger as well as Finley: "[O]bservers who felt that 
Kroger was wrongly decided, and who wanted a statutory rejection of 
Finley, would have embraced what the Committee suggested regarding 
supplemental jurisdiction."24 He asserts that the FCSC "would have over-
ruled Kroger."25 
Professor Freer is wrong on this point. The Committee's explanation of 
its recommendation contains limiting language that Freer quotes but of 
which he takes no note: 
[W]e recommend that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to 
19 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. at 556. 
2° Freer, supra note 1, at 471. 
21 FCSC REPORT, supra note 8, at 47. 
22 Freer, supra note 1, at 469 (footnote omitted). 
28 437 U.S. 365 (1978) [hereinafter Kroger]. For Freer's critique of Kroger, see Freer, supra 
note 1, at 458-64. 
,.. Freer, supra note 1, at 470. 
•• Id. at 476. 
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hear any claim arising out of the same "transaction or occurrence" 
as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within fed-
eral question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional par-
ties, namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has a closely 
related state claim.28 
949 
If this language left any doubt that the FCSC had no intention of tink-
ering with the complete diversity requirement or disturbing the Kroger 
result, the Chairman of the Committee, Third Circuit Senior Judge J o-
seph F. Weis, Jr., soon dispelled it. Testifying in September 1990 before a 
House Judiciary Subcommittee chaired by then Congressman Robert 
Kastenmeier, also an FCSC member,27 Judge Weis discussed an earlier 
draft of supplemental jurisdiction legislation, stating: "[It] would change 
the doctrine of complete diversity articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 
Cranch 267 and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 
365 (1978). The Study Committee did not intend to encourage additional 
diversity litigation in that fashion."28 
As Judge Weis' testimony makes clear, the legislative overruling of 
Kroger favored by Professor Freer would have been inconsistent with the 
FCSC's recommendation to abolish most general diversity jurisdiction.29 
Indeed, it is baffling how Freer could conclude that the same committee 
could have recommended such diametrically contradictory proposals. 
Moreover, overruling Kroge~· would have taken the new statute out of the 
•e FCSC REPoRT, supra note 8, at 47 (emphasis added), quoted in Freer, supra note 1, at 469 
n.132. The FCSC's limit on its recommendation for supplemental jurisdiction over added parties to 
cases "within federal question jurisdiction" is ainsistent with its concern for Finley's effect of some-
times "delegating the determination of federal issues to the state courts." FCSC REPoRT, supra note 
8, at 47 (emphasis added). 
07 It may also be relevant on the question of what the FCSC recommended that each of the three 
authors of this reply was involved in some capacity with the Committee. Professor Rowe was a Re-
porter to an FCSC subcommittee, and Professors Burbank and Mengler were Consultants. Indeed, 
Professor Mengler advised the Committee specifically regarding supplemental jurisdiction. 
as Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing 
on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1990) (pre-
pared statement of Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr.) [hereinafter House Hearing]. See also id. at 713, 714-
15 (letter from Professor Larry Kramer, Reporter to the FCSC subcommittee that generated the 
supplemental jurisdiction recommendation, to Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr. {Aug. 21, 1990), criticizing 
an earlier version of the supplemental jurisdiction statute that would have overruled Kroger). Profes-
sor Kramer's letter is quoted in the te:{t accompanying note 48 infra. 
u See FCSC REPoRT, supra note 8, at 38-42. 
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category of the noncontroversial. In overruling Finley and codifying most 
of the pre-Finley status quo, the statute remains within the noncontrover-
sial realm and is faithful to the FCSC's recommendations. 
Professor Freer is not content to charge that we "three law profes-
sors,"30 all of whom were involved in the work of the FCSC,31 subverted 
its recommendation about supplemental jurisdiction. He claims that the 
House Report misrepresents what the statute accomplishes.32 Although he 
may prove correct on one point as to which the Report tries to fill a statu-
tory gap,33 in the main he is a victim of his preconceptions and a prisoner 
of his prior work in the area.34 These blinders cause him at times to gen-
eralize restrictions applicable only when jurisdiction is "founded only on 
section 1332."35 More seriously, they lead him to neglect the qualification 
that even those restrictions apply only when the exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction "would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of 
section 1332."36 As advertised in the House Report, "[t]he net effect of 
subsection (b),"37 with but "one small change in pre-Finley practice,"38 
3° Freer, supra note 1, at 446 n.13, 470. 
31 See supra note 27. 
32 See Freer, supra note 1, at 471 (statute did not do "what the House Report said that it did"). 
33 See infra note 90. • 
84 For example, in his Essay Professor Freer tries to perform CPR on a thesis he advanced in an 
earlier article. See Freer, supra note 1, at 454-57 (urging view previously developed in Freer, A 
Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental jurisdiction, 1987 DuKE L.J. 34). In his Duke Law 
journal article, Professor Freer contended that Congress had already enacted supplemental jurisdic-
tion through its adoption of the term "civil action" in the 1948 codification of the jurisdiction statutes. 
He continues to maintain this thesis even though neither Congress nor any court of which we and he 
are aware has ever expressly attached such significance to the 1948 amendments. For further criticism 
of Freer's thesis, see Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. 
REv. 247, 261-65. 
•• See infra text accompanying notes 51-53. 
38 See infra text accompanying notes 56-58, note 86 and accompanying text. The quotation in 
the text is from subsection {b) of section 1367, which limits supplemental jurisdiction when original 
federal court jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 {1988). The 
full text of the subsection, 28 U.S.C. § 1367{b) (West Supp. 1991), is as follows: 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely 
on section 1332 of this title [the general diversity provision], the district courts shall not 
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims made by plaintiffs against 
persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, 
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising supple-
mental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional require-
ments of section 1332. 
37 HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29 n.16. 
88 Id. at 29. 
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"is to implement the principal rationale of [Kroger]."39 For Professor 
Freer, it appears, that is the rub. 
3. Antidiversity Bias 
Despite his view of Kroger, Professor Freer writes at times as if he 
would have endorsed legislation that codified its rule. He says that if the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute had "simply overruled Finley and codi-
fied extant practice ... it would have been a welcome addition,"40 and 
agrees that "a statute intended to codify pre-Finley practice would have to 
codify Kroger."41 In almost the same breath, however, he writes that in 
his view Kroger is "unworthy of codification."42 Getting past this equivo-
cation, the reader cannot mistake Professor Freer's dislike of Kroger and 
dismay at the statute. Using increasingly purple language/3 Freer con-
demns section 1367 for codifying and, in his view, "greatly extend[ing]"44 
what he sees as Kroger's anti-diversity bias. 
As we shall explain,415 section 1367 works no great or even significant 
extensions in the limits on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. In-
deed, the statute saves such jurisdiction over defendants' state law claims 
against nondiverse third-party defendants from Finley's very real threat.46 
Here, though, we focus on the charge of bias against diversity jurisdiction 
and against diversity plaintiffs in particular. First, for the statute to have 
much chance of passing Congress with the late start necessitated by the 
FCSC's reporting date only seven months before elections, it could not 
89 Id. at 29 n.16. 
•o Freer, supra note 1, at 446. 
u Id. at 476. 
•• Id. 
•a See id. at 446 (§ 1367 "embodies a disquieting bias against diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion"); i~. at 460 (describing Kroger as "a reaction of frustration .... an unprincipled, naked an-
tidiversity case") (footnote omitted); id. at 471 (§ 1367 has effect of "maiming efficient packaging of 
diversity cases"); id. at 476 ("the supplemental jurisdiction statute codifies [Kroger's] schizophrenic 
treatment of claims"; "Kroger was an unprincipled, result-oriented opinion based upon antipathy to 
diversity jurisdiction, ... passed off'' as following congressional intent); id. at 480 (statute's "punish-
ment of the diversity plaintiff is absurd"; its "obsession with punishing the diversity plaintiff ... leads 
to preposterous ... changes from current practice"). 
•• Id. at 471. 
•a See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text. 
•a See supra note 12 (post-Finley cases rejecting supplemental jurisdiction over impleader claims 
_ against nondiverse third-party defendants). 
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effect major changes in existing practice or significant expansion of federal 
court jurisdiction. As Professor Larry Kramer, Reporter for the FCSC 
subcommittee. that produced the supplemental jurisdiction recommenda-
tion, wrote to Chairman Weis about an earlier draft of the statute·" that 
would have overruled Kroger and gone at least a considerable distance 
toward overruling Strawbridge: "This makes passage riskier, since the 
provision no longer simply restores pre-Finley law but makes a substan-
tial change that extends federal jurisdiction."48 
Second, Professor Freer's heated charges of bias, lack of principle, and 
covert motivation49 appear mainly to reflect his own cast of mind; he re-
ally doesn't like Kroger, and he can't seem to accept that sincere, intelli-
gent, principled lawyers and judges can find the decision correct or even 
tenable. Whether one regards Kroger as right or wrong, however, it 
evinces a concern about easy, noncollusive circumvention of the well-es-
tablished complete diversity requirement. The Kroger holding prevents a 
diversity plaintiff from getting around the requirement by suing a diverse 
defendant, waiting for that defendant to bring a third-party indemnity 
complaint against a co-citizen of the plaintiff, and then adding a state law 
claim against the new party. Lawyers pull off more complicated maneu-
vers every day, and it appears that Professor Freer would leave the federal 
courts powedess to respond to such evasion of the complete diversity rule 
as long as the original defendant was not a sham party.Go 
Further, it is not clear how far Professor Freer would go in overruling 
· other applications of the complete diversity rule. At an extreme, one could 
., H.R. 5381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 120 (1990), reprinted in House Hearing, supra note 28, 
at 28-32. 
u Letter from Prof. Larry Kramer to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (Aug. 21, 1990), at 2, reprinted 
in House Hearing, supra note 28, at 713, 714. 
•e See supra note 43; Freer, supra note 1, at 460 (viewing Kroger as federal judges' "reaction of 
frustration" to Congress' refusal to abolish diversity jurisdiction). 
•• See Freer, supra note 1, at 480 (suggesting that "(i]f parties truly are suing strawpeople to 
create diversity jurisdiction and await the subsequent joinder of nondiverse absentees, there is an 
adequate remedy in section 1359"). 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988) provides, "A district court shall not have 
jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or 
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." Actually, the remedy for suing a 
sham defendant may be dismissal of that party without need to resort to section 1359. Professor 
Freer's discussion says nothing of the situation in which a plaintiff sues a diverse defendant against 
whom the plaintiff has a genuine claim, but also seeks to evade the bar on incomplete diversity suits 
by waiting to claim against an expe~ed nondiverse third-party defendant. 
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abandon it entirely, which effects a potentially enormous expansion in 
federal diversity jurisdiction, threatening to swamp the federal courts with 
state-law cases involving mostly adversaries from the same state. No one 
can seriously suggest that such a measure would have been a faithful im-
plementation of the FCSC Report or that the idea would have had a 
chance of passing Congress. This side of abandoning the complete diver-
sity rule, one would have to make different decisions from those made in 
section 1367 about where to draw the lines. The likely result would be a 
statute of considerable complexity, subject to many or"the criticisms Pro-
fessor Freer levels at section 1367, in an effort to strike and define a dif-
ferent balance. 
As for what the new statute affects, it goes nowhere nearly so far as 
Professor Freer claims when he writes that "supplemental jurisdiction 
cannot be exercised over claims asserted by a plaintiff."111 In making such 
broad statements,112 he neglects to mention the key qualification in section 
1367(b) that imposes such limits on supplemental jurisdiction only in 
cases that are before federal courts solely under the general diversity juris-
diction. 53 Because of this' qualification, a more accurate statement of the 
supplemental jurisdiction limit to which Professor Freer refers would be 
that under section 1367, supplemental jurisdiction cannot be exercised 
over some claims asserted by a plaintiff in a case brought in federal court 
solely under section 1332, when that exercise would permit ready circum-
vention of the complete diversity requirement. 
Professor Freer sees in this .structure an "obsession with punishing the 
diversity plaintiff," which he regards as "absurd."114 His rhetoric, again, 
reflects his predispositions and overstates his case; one need not view as 
"punishment" a structure that provides choices with explicit limits on 
what you get when you make one of the choices. "Punishment" comes 
only ex post if the diversity plaintiff ignores the clear ex ante message of 
Kroger and the new statute: if you want to bring an incomplete diversity 
state law case all in one piece, sue in state court. Potential diversity plain-
81 See Freer, supra note 1, at 474. 
a• See also id. ("Impleader claims will carry supplemental jurisdiction only if they are asserted 
by nonplaintiffs."). 
as Section 1367(b), the subsection imposing the limits on supplemental jurisdiction that Professor 
Freer criticizes, begins: "In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction 
founded solely on section 1332 of this title •... " 
114 Freer, supra note 1, at 480. 
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tiffs, unlike exclusive jurisdiction federal question plaintiffs under Finley, 
always have that option. For that matter, so do concurrent jurisdiction 
federal question plaintiffs. Yet one need not oppose diversity jurisdiction 
to believe that plaintiffs seeking to use an available federal forum for fed-
eral claims should not have to pay the price that Finley exacts - bring 
two suits, forgo one claim, or use state court.1111 If Professor Freer insists 
on characterizing this structure as reflecting "bias" against diversity juris-
diction, we can only say that he is replacing rational argument with a 
loaded word. 
4. Complete Diversity in Alienage Cases 
Professor Freer believes that "by overbroad reference in the exceptions 
clause of section 1367(b)68 to cases brought on any of the bases contained 
in section 1332 [the general diversity statute]," new section 1367 "pro-
hibit[s] pendent parties jurisdiction in alienage cases."67 He must not have 
considered the last clause of section 1367(b), under which the restrictions 
on supplemental jurisdiction in that subsection have effect only "when ex-
ercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent 
with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."158 The complete di-
versity rule is a product of judicial interpretation, found nowhere in statu-
tory text before or after the adoption of section 1367. To whatever extent 
the federal courts were free before to reinterpret section 1332's 'Jurisdic-
tional requirements" to abolish the complete diversity rule for alienage 
cases, they remain every bit as free to do so today. Section 1367 is neutral 
on the subject, as it should be. 
The federal courts' application of the complete diversity rule to alienage 
cases has produced a dysfunctional crazy quilt of results,159 and we agree 
with Professor Freer's implication that serious consideration should be 
88 The FCSC observed that both judicial and legislative rules to confine diversity jurisdiction 
have long existed. It described the nature of some of these limiting rules and explained their relation 
to the federal courts' mission of enforcing .federal law, viewing the rules as "pragmatic but essentially 
arbitrary attempt[s] to limit the diversion of federal courts from their primary role of litigating federal 
constitutional and statutory issues." FCSC REPORT, supra note 8, at 40. 
80 See supra note 36. 
81 Freer, supra note 1, at 475 . 
.. 28 u.s.a. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
80 See, e.g., Rowe, Abolishing Diversity jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for 
Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REv. 963, 967-68 {1979). 
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given to adopting a rule of minimal diversity for alienage cases. Yet abol-
ishing the complete diversity rule in this far from trivial portion of the 
federal docket,60 by judicial decision or by legislation, should come only 
after careful assessment of its likely impact. That would not have been 
possible under the circumstances of section 1367's adoption in the waning 
days of the last Congress. The new statute does not lock in the complete 
diversity rule for alienage cases; it properly leaves the situation as it stood 
before. 
5. The Necessary Party! Intervention Anomaly 
Before section 1367's enactment, the same person could intervene in a 
diversity suit as of right under Rule 24(a) on a supplemental basis, but 
fall outside the court's supplemental jurisdiction if parties already in the 
action (or the court) sought to effect that person's joinder as a necessary 
party under Rule 19. The distinction lay solely in who took the initiative, 
not in any difference in the way that the outsider's situation related to the 
existing proceeding and parties. If the nonparty sought to intervene as a 
plaintiff, the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plain-
tiff intervenor's claims; if the outsider sought to intervene as a defendant, 
the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction and additionally permit 
the nondiverse plaintiff to amend its complaint to bring claims against the 
defendant intervenor. By contrast, if the court or a party already in the 
action sought to join the same outsider as either a plaintiff or a defendant 
via Rule 19, the court could not permit the joinder on a supplemental 
basis.61 
This anomaly made no sense to most commentators,62 and Professor 
60 See A. PARTRIDGE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY jURIS-
DICTION 23-24 (1988) (alienage cases accounted for 8.3% of sample of 403 diversity cases filed in 
1986). 
61 See generally 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1917, at 472-81 (2d ed. 1986). The rules stated in the text did not apply, regardless of which 
party took the joinder initiative, if the court concluded that the outsider was a diversity-destroying 
"indispensable" party. In that case the court was obliged not only to deny the joinder but also to 
dismiss the entire action. 
u See, e.g., Berch, The Erection of a Barrier Against Assertion of Ancillary Claims: An Exami-
nation of Owen Equipment and Erection Company v. Kroger, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 258-60; 
Garvey, The Limits of Ancillary jurisdiction, 57 TEX. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (1979); Kennedy, Let's 
All join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Kv. L.J. 329, 362-63 {1969); Mengler, supra 
note 34, at 285. 
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Freer is a member of the club. 63 One option for Congress, of course, 
would have been to ignore these commentators' calls for consistency; in 
codifying supplemental jurisdiction as it essentially existed before Finley, 
Congress could have kept this blemish. Sensibly, it chose not to follow this 
route. That left the issue of how best to resolve the anomaly. The drafters 
believed that codifying the essentials of supplemental jurisdiction as it ex-
isted before Finley meant taking Kroger seriously. In parts of his Essay, 
Professor Freer- despite his distaste for Kroger- grudgingly agrees.64 
Still, he argues strenuously that section 1367 resolves the old anomaly the 
wrong way. He expresses particular concern for the plight of excluded 
plaintiff intervenors of right, despite the federal courts' ability to protect 
them from harm in their absence by dismissing the federal action for refil-
ing in state court. 65 
Once it is conceded that, in codifying the essentials of pre-Finley sup-
plemental jurisdiction, one "would have to codify Kroger,"66 resolving the 
anomaly becomes straightforward. Kroger's principal rationale is impli-
cated when a diversity plaintiff who chose the federal forum seeks to as-
sert a claim against a nondiverse defendant intervenor. As Professor Freer 
has acknowledged in an earlier article, 
The plaintiff may choose, for example, to sue only one of two poten-
tial defendants, "knowing" that self-interest will force the nondi-
verse absentee to intervene and that,intervention of right will carry 
with it ancillary jurisdiction. In such a case, the plaintiff is achieving 
indirectly what he could not achieve directly .... 67 
Kroger's rationale is also implicated by efforts at joinder of prospective 
plaintiffs under Rules 19 and 24: those who would have destroyed com-
plete diversity if joined originally should not succeed later by the simple, 
expedient method of waiting for someone else to bring a complete diversity 
suit first. Congress' choice in eliminating the anomaly - not to foster easy 
evasions of the complete diversity requirement - is the only resolution 
88 See Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal tp Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1085-88 (1985). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
85 See Freer, supm note 1, at 476-78. 
88 Id. at 476. 
87 Freer, supra note 34, at 73 (footnotes omitted). 
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that takes seriously the Supreme Court's treatment of supplemental juris-
diction before Finley. 
6. Joinder of Nondiverse Defendants Under Rule 19 
Section 1367 generally prohibits supplemental jurisdiction over a diver-
sity plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse defendant joined as a necessary 
party under Rule 19, but does not prohibit the Rule 19 defendant's join-
der.68 This, Professor Freer alleges, is nonsense. "How can an absentee," 
he asks, "be a necessary defendant without the plaintiff's having a claim 
against him ?"69 
Professor Freer has apparently overlooked the implications of the Su-
preme Court's 1989 decision in Martin v. Wilks.70 In that case a class of 
minority employees had brought an employment discrimination suit under 
Title VII against their employer, the city of Birmingham, Alabama. The 
plaintiff class did not raise any claims against the city's majority employ-
ees. When the latter subsequently challenged the consent decree that had 
settled the litigation, the Supreme Court, allowing their challenge, sug-
gested that the plaintiff c~ass could have properly joined them as necessary 
party defendants under Rule 19.71 Because the majority employees had 
protectable interests that might have been impaired by an affirmative ac-
tion decree, they could have been joined as Rule 19 defendants, even 
though the plaintiff class had no claims against them. 
Other commentators, including one of us, have noted that the Wilks 
scenario is fairly common.72 Third persons often have interests that might 
be affected by a lawsuit if the plaintiff were to prevail, even though the 
68 See supra note 36 (quoting subsection (b) of the statute); Invitation, supra note 3, at 215 
n.23. Section 1367{b) also prohibits supplemental jurisdiction over a diversity plaintiff's claim against 
a nondiverse intervenor-defendant but does not prohibit the intervention itself. 
es Freer, supra note 1, at 479 (emphasis in original). 
70 490 u.s. 755 (1989). 
71 See id. at 765-67. 
72 See Mengler, supra note 34, at 234-85; see also Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the Party 
Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 863, 
911 (1990) ("Before proceeding, it is important to recognize that a person can be someone to be joined 
as a defendant if feasible, and even can be an indispensable party, when the plaintiff has no claim 
against the person.") (emphasis in original). In an earlier article, Professor Freer also seems to have 
understood that there can be necessary defendants against whom the plaintiff has no claim. See Freer, 
supra note 63, at 1104 & n.208. 
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plaintiff has no claims against the outsiders. A diversity case that illus-
trates the point is Helzberg's Diamond Shops v. Valley West Des Moines 
Shopping Center.73 In that case Valley West, a shopping center operator, 
leased space to Helzberg's, a jeweler. Later, the operator leased other 
space in. the same shopping center to Lord's, a second jeweler. Helzberg's 
then sued Valley West in federal court, contending that the lease to Lord's 
violated a noncompetition clause in its lease with Valley West. Helzberg's 
sought to enjoin Valley West from effectuating its lease with Lord's. 
On these facts, Helzberg's probably has no claim against Lord's. Yet 
Lord's has substantial interests that may be impaired or impeded by an 
injunction and should be joined, if possible, as a necessary party defendant 
under Rule 19.74 Under the prior supplemental jurisdiction la)V, Lord's 
could not be joined on a supplemental basis. But that result, the drafters 
of section 1367 believed, is unwarranted. Lord's has interests related to 
the transaction that is the subject matter of Helzberg's action, and the 
Kroger rationale is not implicated.71; Indeed, Helzberg's may oppose, 
rather than eagerly anticipate, participation by Lord's for fear that its 
involvement in the litigation will hinder settlement between Helzberg's 
and Valley West. Helzberg's suggests that in some circumstances plaintiffs 
may file in federal court in an effort to take advantage of jurisdictional 
limits and thus avoid having to litigate an entire controversy, not to bring 
the whole matter into federal court deviously. Supplemental jurisdiction, 
previously unavailable in such situations in diversity cases, now makes 
complete justice possible - without undermining Kroger by making it 
easy for plaintiffs to bring claims against nondiverse defendants. 
If Professor Freer had considered how section 1367 can work in cases 
like Helzberg's, he might not have been so quick to claim that the new 
statute "maims packaging in diversity cases."76 Overall, the net effect of 
the statute's modest alteration of pre-Finley law - in diversity cases, re-
stricting supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 24(a) intervention of right 
•• 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977). Professor Freer cited and discussed this case in a previous 
article. See ·Freer, supra note 63, at 1090 & n.141. 
•• In the actual case, personal jurisdiction obstacles kept Lord's from being joined. See 564 F.2d 
at 817 n.t. 
•• For further discussion, see Mengler, supra note 34, at 284-85. In an earlier article, Professor 
Freer acknowledged this point. See Freer, supra note 63, at 1104 ("In a [case like Helzberg's], no 
such manipulation of diversity jurisdiction would result by exercising ancillary jurisdiction."). 
78 Freer, supra note 1, at 446. 
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and expanding it over Rule 19 necessary party joinder - may be a wash. 
7. Preposterous Results and Unanswered Questions? 
Professor Freer discusses several situations not specifically addressed in 
the statute,77 suggesting either that its language yields "preposterous"78 
and "ridiculous results"79 that the courts can avoid "only by creative in-
terpretation,"80 or that it may yield no answer at all.81 Whatever one's 
view on the individual questions raised, it is hard to read Professor 
Freer's criticisms without concluding that the underlying issue is whose ox 
is gored. Knowing that it is Professor Freer's ox helps one to understand, 
if not to agree with, his extravagant claims about the impact of the new 
statute. To our minds, responsible courts should usually have little if any 
difficulty reading it to avoid the "absurd"82 results conjured up by a dis-
appointed advocate of a radically different structure. 
First, some of the unanswered questions to 'which Professor Freer 
points - such as supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' compulsory 
state law counterclaims against nondiverse third-party defendants,83 and 
over impleader and crossclaims against nondiverse parties by plaintiffs de-
fending against counterclaims84 - have probably come up far more on 
law school exams than in reported decisions. Legislating on such specifics 
without more concrete case law experience would have risked the very 
statutory rigidity that Professor Freer erroneously imputes to section 
1367,85 and would have forgone the benefits of the lower court case law 
development that he is so eager to embrace when he is not straining to 
score points against the new statute. 
Further, as we suggested in our discussion of the statute's application to 
alienage cases, the final clause of section 1367(b) -which imposes some 
77 See id. at 481-86. 
78 I d. at 482. 
7e Id. at 484. 
so Id. 
81 See id. at 485 (expressing uncertainty whether exclusions from supplemental jurisdiction ap-
ply in removed diversity cases). 
82 Freer, supra note 1, at 483. 
83 See id. at 481-82. 
84 See id. at 482-84. 
85 See id. at 480. 
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restrictions on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases only when its 
exercise "would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of 
section 1332" - provides a basis for treating such situations.86 Sympa-
thetic attention to that language, in light of the expressed congressional 
intent "to implement the principal rationale of Kroger,"67 should provide 
a sensible answer to the questions raised by Professor Freer and enable 
the federal courts to avoid the "preposterous"88 and "ridiculous"89 results 
he belabors.90 His neglect of this key aspect of the statute means, to sepa-
80 See supra text following note 57. Our view of this clause in section 1367(b) means that we do 
not accept Professor Freer's charge that judicial interpretations to avoid results he fears would be 
"without one shred of support in the statute," Freer, supra note 1, at 483. We do, however, agree 
with him that our previously suggested distinction between "claims" and "counterclaims" to deal with 
supplemental jurisdiction over diversity plaintiffs' compulsory counterclaims against nondiverse third-
party defendants is too facile. Id. at 481 & n.189 (citing Invitation, supra note 3, at 215 n.17). The 
federal courts still remain free to consider whether the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332 do 
or do not exclude supplemental jurisdiction over such counterclaims. The legislative history's general 
endorsement of prior case law, see HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 29, provides a solid foundation 
for upholding supplemental jurisdiction over diversity plaintiffs' compulsory counterclaims against 
third-party defendants. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 {7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 {1982). 
87 HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 29 n.16. 
88 Freer, supra note 1, at 482. 
88 Id. at 484. 
•• Two other situations mentioned by Professor Freer call for brief discussion. First, he raises 
the possibility that section 1367{b) may not govern in removed diversity cases because the general 
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441{a), {b) {1988), could be interpreted as granting original jurisdiction 
and would then take such cases out of the category of actions with "original jurisdiction founded solely 
on section 1332" to which section 1367{b) applies. Freer, supra note 1, at 485. We do not see the 
problem because section 1441 (a) removal depends on the existence of original district court jurisdic-
tion created elsewhere in federal law. Applicability of section 1367(b), of course, need not mean that 
all rules for supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases filed in federal court govern in removed diver-
sity cases, depending on the view the courts take of "the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332." 
These requirements might not prohibit supplemental jurisdiction over the claim of a plaintiff who did 
not choose the federal forum against a nondiverse third-party defendant, even though the concern for 
evasion of diversity requirements persists (albeit in attenuated form). 
Professor Freer also points out that on its face, section 1367 does not appear to forbid supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims of class members that do not satisfy section 1332's jurisdictional amount re-
quirement, which would overrule Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (holding that 
unnamed class members with separate claims must each satisfy any applicable jurisdictional amount 
requirement}. He notes a disclaimer of intent to accomplish this result in the legislative history. Freer, 
supra note 1, at 485-86 (citing HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 29}. It would have been better had 
the statute dealt explicitly with this problem, and the legislative history was an attempt to correct the 
oversight. The resulting combination of statutory language and legislative history, however, creates the 
delicious possibility that despite Justice Scalia's opposition to the use of legislative history, he will 
have to look to the history or conclude that section 1367 has wiped Zahn off the books. See generally 
Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress 
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rate wheat from chaff, that his parade of horribles is made of straw. 
More broadly, codifying a complex area like supplemental jurisdiction 
- as Professor Freer's discussion illustrates - is itself complex business. 
A danger is that the result of the effort to deal with all the foreseeables 
will be a statute too prolix and baroque for everyday use and application 
by practitioners and judges. Section 1367 reflects an effort to provide suffi-
cient detail without overdoing it. The statute is concededly not perfect.91 
What it accomplishes, however, is to change the direction taken by the 
Supreme Court in Finley, to provide basic guidance (in particular the leg-
islative history's general approval of pre-Finley case law, which has -
treated some specific issues Professor Freer raises), and then to trust the 
federal courts under the changed direction to interpret the statute sensibly 
- much as Professor Freer puzzlingly seems to think they would have 
done under Finley's mistaken lead without the statute. Why he should be 
so optimistic about their performance under Finley, and so fearful of what 
they will do with that decision overruled by statute, is a mystery. With his 
illumination of the wrong turns the federal courts might take if they 
wanted to make the worst of the new regime, we hope and believe they 
can be trusted to make the best of it. 
Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160. 
et Far more serious than the problems Professor Freer raises is section 1367(b)'s silence about 
supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse parties proposed to be added after initial filing as plaintiffs 
under Rule 20 (permissive joinder of parties), given the explicit restriction on supplemental jurisdic-
tion over claims by existing plaintiffs against "persons made parties under Rule ... 20." Original 
filing of a diversity complaint by two plaintiffs, one of them not of diverse citizenship from a defen-
dant, remains barred by the complete diversity interpretatjon of the requirements for original diversity 
jurisdiction. Literally, though, section 1367(b) does not bar an original complete diversity filing and 
subsequent amendment to add a nondiverse co-plaintiff under Rule 20, taking advantage of supple-
mental jurisdiction over the claim of the new plaintiff against the existing defendant. We can only 
hope that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity require-
ment - either by regarding it as an unacceptable circumvention of original diversity jurisdiction 
requirements, or by reference to the intent not to abandon the complete diversity rule that is clearly 
expressed in the legislative history of section 1367. 

